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Academic Freedom versus Academic Legitimacy 
David Schraub* 
What does it mean when a university department invites a person to 
speak?  It clearly does not mean that the department endorses the speaker’s 
views.  Persons are regularly invited to speak in a university setting whose 
views are opposed by many, if not most, of their audience—often including 
the very people who invited them.  Rather, the invitation indicates that the 
department believes the speaker is academically legitimate: their 
contribution is one that, whether right or wrong, usefully advances 
scholarly discussion.  It is probable that most members of a university 
community believe that both Newt Gingrich and David Duke are “wrong”, 
but only one’s views are illegitimate. 
Academic freedom and academic legitimacy map imperfectly onto one 
another. Academic freedom is content-neutral: it does not attempt to 
distinguish between “correct” and “incorrect” views.  Academic legitimacy, 
by contrast, is very concerned with content: it asserts that certain views 
should not be considered valid entrants into a productive scholarly 
discussion. But these two concepts are often conflated.  A university facing 
criticism over a controversial speaker will often respond by invoking 
“academic freedom.”  This is a valid response at one level: academic 
freedom implies that even a David Duke cannot be barred from speaking if 
invited by an authorized member of the university community.  But at 
another level, it misses the point entirely.  The problem is not that Duke 
was allowed by some higher university authority to speak, the problem is 
that he was invited in the first place; that a department or research center or 
student group believed his views were academically legitimate.  To 
structure the question in terms of academic freedom—should he be 
banned—misstates the good being pursued.  The demand is not for formal 
barriers against such horrible views but to not need such barriers at all. 
To see why this distinction matters, consider another obvious truth: 
David Duke is not invited to speak at colleges.  This is not because 
“academic freedom” is being systematically breached, but rather because 
the academic community has voluntarily decided that Duke’s views do not 
make any useful scholarly contribution.  And that we’ve made that decision 
is a very good thing; we would rightly worry about the caliber of an 
academic community that could not come to a general intersubjective 
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agreement that Duke’s views are illegitimate. 
But what happens when this consensus doesn’t exist?  Efforts to 
restrict allegedly malign ideologies are assumed to be a tool of the strong, 
but often they are a tactic of the weak—people who are not confident that 
their community will unify in agreement that the ideology is in fact 
oppressive.  That there now is massive intersubjective agreement that overt 
White supremacist ideology is illegitimate gives people of color nothing 
more than what Whites long enjoyed effortlessly, and if that consensus 
were threatened minority students would be rightly concerned. 
Many controversies labeled as ones of “academic freedom” are 
actually about academic legitimacy.  Is Pat Robertson properly analogized 
to David Duke?  Is Gilad Atzmon?  The Black Panthers?  BDS activists?  
David Horowitz?  What about “scientific” creationists or climate change 
denialists?  It is fair game to argue that a well-functioning university 
community would not view any or all of these persons as academically 
legitimate, and that position itself is perfectly consistent with believing that 
agreements regarding academic legitimacy cannot be enforced through 
explicit bans or sanctions.  That is all that “academic freedom” contributes 
to the discussion: a constraint on remedies.  Enlisting it to do more confuses 
two distinct questions and sidesteps the true nature of many academic 
controversies. 
 
